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ABSTRACT 
Hardware virtualization technologies play a significant role in cyber security. On the one hand these 
technologies enhance security levels, by designing a trusted operating system. On the other hand these 
technologies can be taken up into modern malware which is rather hard to detect. None of the existing 
methods is able to efficiently detect a hypervisor in the face of countermeasures such as time cheating, 
temporary self-uninstalling, memory hiding etc. New hypervisor detection methods which will be 
described in this paper can detect a hypervisor under these countermeasures and even count several nested 
ones. These novel approaches rely on the new statistical analysis of time discrepancies by examination of 
a set of instructions, which are unconditionally intercepted by a hypervisor. Reliability was achieved 
through the comprehensive analysis of the collected data despite its fluctuation. These offered methods 
were comprehensively assessed in both Intel and AMD CPUs. 
Keywords: hypervisor threat, rootkit hypervisor, nested hypervisors, instruction execution time, statistics 
and data analysis, Blue Pill. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays successful malware detection is 
becoming increasingly important, because 
malware cyber-attacks can result in financial, 
reputational, process and other losses. We can 
overcome these risks only through anticipatory 
development of advanced cyber security solutions. 
Intel and AMD have released more advanced 
CPUs with hardware virtualization support, which 
runs code directly on top of the physical hardware. 
This privileged code is named Virtual Machine 
Monitor (VMM), bare-metal hypervisor or just 
“hypervisor”. A hypervisor with a secure system 
monitor functions allows us to run multiple OSes  
at the same time in one PC, (see Figure 1). As a 
result this architecture maximizes the hardware 
utilization and reduces the costs of operation. This 
is an obvious advantage of hardware virtualization 
based hypervisors (Derock, 2009; Barrett, & 
Kipper, 2010). At present more than a billion 
processors with this technology are installed in 
workstations as well as in cloud computing servers 
on the Internet. 
However, at the same time hardware virtualization 
technology increases vulnerability of systems, 
seeing that rootkit hypervisor with backdoor 
functionality can be planted in the PC (Ben-
Yehuda, 2013). This type of rootkits is also knows 
as Hardware-based Virtual Machine Rootkit 
(HVM rootkit). 
The cyber security community faces the challenge  
of hypervisor detection. Presently there is no 
built-in tool to detect a hypervisor reliably. Of 
course we can check basic things: CR4.VMXE 
(Intel, 2014) bit in Intel case or EFER.SVME bit 
in AMD case (AMD, 2013), but a hypervisor can 
hide its original value. Moreover, it is impossible 
to block, stop or unload a hypervisor by using 
existing known cyber security tools, resides on 
virtualized OS level. 
 
  
Figure 1 PC without Hypervisor and under Control of the Two Nested Hypervisors:  
a Legitimate one and Rootkit 
 
The difficulties of this challenge arise from the 
following causes. Firstly hypervisors can use a 
wide variety of different techniques to prevent 
detection. Secondly, it is possible to run several 
nested hypervisors. Thirdly, a hypervisor can be 
installed via a driver or boot records as well as 
via BIOS (Kovah, Kallenberg, Butterworth, & 
Cornwell, 2014) or UEFI (Bulygin, Loucaides, 
Furtak, Bazhaniuk, & Matrosov, 2014), which 
makes the deleting of a hypervisor rather 
difficult.  
Utin (2014) analyzed the possibility of 
BIOS-based hypervisor threat. The author’s 
ideas are based on the suspicious hypervisor 
(Russian Ghost) whose detection is simple, 
because it does not apply any countermeasures. 
Despite the fact that hardware virtualization is 
not new and involves a world-wide community 
of researchers, the development of effective 
hypervisor detection methods has so far been 
without success. 
The goal of this paper is to tackle this issue. This 
article presents new detection methods which are 
based on the difference between the instructions 
execution time (IET) both, with a hypervisor and 
without it. We applied a set of specific 
instructions which cause VM-exits 
unconditionally or are trapped by a hypervisor. 
As a result, IET takes significantly more time 
with a hypervisor than without any hypervisor. 
This time discrepancy is commonly used to 
detect hypervisors. However, detection by time 
is possible only if a hypervisor is not hiding 
itself via timestamp cheating (Fritsch, 2008; 
Garfinkel, Adams, Warfield, & Franklin, 2007) 
or via a temporary self-uninstalling hypervisor – 
the Blue Chicken technique (Rutkowska, & 
Tereshkin, 2007). Under these conditions the 
hypervisor detection methods based on time 
discrepancies will not work. Therefore, a totally 
new hypervisor detection approach, which is 
resilient to countermeasures, is needed. 
In a nutshell the proposed methods consider  
the IET as a random variable, whose properties 
depend on hypervisor presence. That is why by 
applying probabilistic and statistical methods to 
IET, it may be possible to detect a hypervisor. 
Our detection methods have improved on the 
current time-based detection method, which uses 
unconditionally intercepted instructions. Unlike 
the original method our approach is able to 
detect any stealthy hypervisor, which has 
applied countermeasures: time-cheating, 
temporary self-uninstalling etc. This is a distinct 
advantage of these new methods. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of 
the most popular software and hardware 
hypervisor detection approaches. The analysis 
will be given in the case of a hypervisor using 
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 countermeasures to prevent its detection, such as 
time cheating, temporary self-uninstalling, 
preventing memory dump acquisition etc. 
Section 3 contains the processor behavior 
analysis in the three cases without a hypervisor, 
with one and several nested hypervisors. 
Analysis has discovered new useful statistics for 
the IET, which can reveal hypervisors. 
In section 4 the experimental results of statistics 
examination are presented. The positive results 
of these checks make it possible to analyze IET 
as a random variable. As a result this allows us 
to use threshold values of statistics to detect each 
hypervisor. This approach works well under the 
countermeasures and fluctuations of measured 
time durations. The present author’s threshold 
generated methods and hypervisor detection 
approaches and their analysis are briefly 
presented. 
Section 5 contains the main conclusions and 
further research directions. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Nowadays there is no hypervisor detection 
build-in tool for Intel. The built-in tool for AMD 
CPU is vulnerable to hypervisor 
countermeasures. Therefore researchers are 
working hard to solve this challenge. This paper 
gives a classification and analysis of all publicly 
available hypervisor detection methods and 
approaches. 
The history of hypervisor detection started in 
2007 after the first hypervisor rootkit “Blue Pill” 
was presented by Rutkowska (2006). “Blue Pill” 
is a Windows based driver for AMD CPU. At 
the same time Dai Zovi (2006) released “Vitriol” 
–  
a similar hypervisor for MAC OS and Intel 
CPU. 
The comparative analysis of these two 
hypervisors was presented by Fannon (2014). 
“Blue Pill” and “Vitriol” became high-profile 
tools in information security sphere and 
motivated the creation a lot of different 
approaches to hypervisor detection. Their 
classification is given in Figure 2. We can 
classify these into four categories: 
signature-based, behavior-based, detection based 
on the trusted hypervisor and approaches which 
use time analysis. Signature based detection uses 
memory scanning of hypervisors’ patterns. The 
latter three sections are based on interaction with 
a hypervisor. 
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 Figure 2 Hypervisor Detection Methods Classification 
2.1. Signature-Based Detection  
After a hypervisor has been loaded into memory 
its dispatcher (VMM handler) and Virtual 
Machine Control Structure (VMCS in Intel case) 
will be located in memory. The hypervisor can be 
detected by signature analysis of the physical 
memory (Bulygin & Samyde, 2008; Desnos, 
Filiol, & Lefou, 2011; Medley, 2007). 
This approach consists of two stages: memory 
dump and its inspection, both of which are not 
resilient to the hypervisor’s countermeasures. 
Analysis shows that software based memory dump 
approaches are vulnerable whereas the hardware 
ones are only applicable under laboratory 
conditions (Korkin & Nesterov, 2014). 
Let us analyze how resistant the current 
hypervisor’s signatures are. 
Thus Fritsch (2008) proposed to detect “Blue Pill” 
hypervisor by searching “BLPB”, “BLUE” and 
“BLUP” strings in a memory dump. However, in 
common cases such strings will be unknown to 
analysts. 
The Actaeon system (Graziano, Lanzi, & 
Balzarotti, 2013) is based on searching for VMCS 
fragments. However, this method can sometimes 
fail. For example, hypervisor can allocate in 
memory 100 structures to hamper detection. These 
VMCSes are similar to original VMCS. After that 
the Actaeon system may reveal many false 
VMCSes so separation between the original one 
and the rest will require a considerable amount of 
manual work. 
As a result, signature-based detection is ineffective 
for resistant hypervisors. 
2.2. Behavior-Based Detection 
Behavior-based detection relies on the system 
activity differences in the two cases, with and 
without a hypervisor. There are three 
behavior-based detection methods: TLB-based 
detection and methods based on errors in 
hypervisors and errors in CPUs. 
2.2.1. TLB-Based Detection. It is possible to 
apply the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) 
which is a memory cache used to speed address 
translation to detect a hypervisor (Desnos et al., 
2011; Fritsch, 2008; Morabito, 2012; Wailly, 
2014). 
TLB includes a set of recently accessed virtual and 
corresponding physical addresses. Every time OS 
accesses memory a corresponding TLB entry is 
searched for. If the requested virtual address is 
present in the TLB, the retrieved physical address 
will be used to access memory. In the other case 
the longtime search with the help of Page 
Directory will occur. This peculiarity will be 
discussed later in Section 2.4.1. 
It is known that VM Exit leads to ﬂushing of TLB 
when a hypervisor is present. Otherwise without a 
hypervisor such clearance does not occur. This is 
why hypervisor detection reduces to checking 
TLB content, which can be made in several ways, 
for example by modifying page table entry (Myers 
& Youndt, 2007). 
However, TLB-based detection does not work on 
AMD CPUs and new Intel CPUs. The new 
supplementary TLB fields “ASID” and “PCID” do 
not let VM exit flush TLB. 
2.2.2. Detection Based on Bugs in CPU. A 
hypervisor can be detected with the help of bugs in 
certain CPU models. In these CPUs the results of 
some instructions depend on whether or not a 
hypervisor is present. 
The “Erratum 140” in AMD CPU is based on 
using results of “RDMSR 10h”. The original value 
of time stamp counter (TSC) is returned by 
“RDMSR 10h” while “RDTSC” gets the sum of 
TSC value and VMCS.TSC_OFFSET value 
(AMD, 2011). 
Another bug “VMSAVE 0x67” freezes the 
system. The execution of the VMSAVE 
instruction with 0x67 prefix stops virtualization 
system. Without a hypervisor this error does not 
occur (Barbosa, 2007). 
These detection methods are applicable only for 
outdated CPUs and require non trivial adaptation 
to new CPUs. 
2.2.3. Detection Based on Bugs in Hypervisors. 
There are software hypervisor bugs similar to 
hardware bugs in CPU. 
 Microsoft published their paper “Hypervisor 
Top-Level Functional Specification”, which 
describes how to detect a hypervisor and get 
“Hypervisor Vendor ID Signature”, by using 
CPUID (O'Neill, 2010; Microsoft, 2013). 
Spoofing attack is likely to occur, when a 
hypervisor can replace data, trapped by CPUID 
execution. 
“Blue Pill” hypervisor has a built-in control 
interface, which uses “Bpknock” hypercalls 
(BluePillStudy, 2010; Fritsch, 2008). Calling 
CPUID with EAX=0xbabecafe changes EAX to 
0x69696969, if “Blue Pill” is present. Otherwise 
such a change does not occur. Due to the 
hypervisor’s built-in control interface it is possible 
not only to detect, but also unload a hypervisor 
(Gabris, 2009).  
A hypervisor can also be detected by reading 
debugging messages. For example, a developer or 
hacker might have forgotten to remove DbgPrint 
calls, which can disclose a hypervisor’s activity. 
These approaches can reveal only well-known 
hypervisors, which do not take countermeasures. 
2.3. Detection Based on the Trusted Hypervisor 
A hypervisor which is loaded first can control and 
block activity of hypervisors which are loaded 
later. This detection method was used in “McAfee 
DeepSAFE” (McAfee, 2012), “Hypersight Rootkit 
Detector” (North Security Labs, 2011), “Symantec 
Endpoint Protection” (Korkin, 2012), and it has 
also been mentioned in papers (Park, 2013; Wang 
& Jiang, 2010). 
This detection approach is vulnerable to 
“Man-In-The-Middle” (MITM) attack, in which an 
illegitimate hypervisor can gain control first and 
compromise a legitimate one, which was loaded 
later on. TPM-based attestation of hypervisor can 
avoid this attack, although TMP mechanism is 
vulnerable too (Berger et al., 2006; Brossard & 
Demetrescu, 2012; Wojtczuk, & Rutkowska, 
2009; Wojtczuk, Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2009). 
MITM attack can be also prevented by loading 
hypervisor from BIOS as well as by applying 
Trusted Startup Hardware Module (Accord, 2010). 
However, due to the difficulty of porting this 
detection method, it is applicable only to labs. 
2.4. Time-Based Detection 
Time-based detection uses the measuring of time 
duration of specific operations or profiling of its 
execution time. When a hypervisor is present the 
execution of such operations is intercepted by the 
hypervisor. As a result, their duration will be 
longer than without a hypervisor. 
Four time-based methods can be mentioned: TLB- 
and RSB-based detection, detection based on 
memory access and detection by unconditionally 
intercepted instructions. Let us focus on these 
methods applicable in the situation where a 
hypervisor prevents its detection by time cheating 
and temporary self-uninstalling. 
2.4.1. TLB-Based Detection. As it was mentioned 
before in Section 2.2.1, the TLB flushes every 
time VM exit occurs. After that, the longtime fill 
will happen. It is possible to use this fact to detect 
hypervisor as follows (Ramos, 2009; Rutkowska, 
2007): 
1. Read the content of a specific memory 
address. 
2. Repeat step 1 and measure its duration. In 
this case the TLB entry, which was added 
on step 1, will be used. 
3. Execute unconditionally intercepted 
instruction (forcing a #VMEXIT). 
4. Repeatedly carry out step 2. 
5. Make a conclusion about the hypervisor 
presence by comparing the results of steps 
2 and 4.  
This approach does not work if the hypervisor uses 
time cheating, because there is no significant 
difference between these two steps. This approach 
has the same disadvantages as in Section 2.2.1. 
2.4.2. RSB-Based Detection. Another detection 
method is based on Return Stack Buffer (RSB), 
which increases computer performance. RSB 
content as well as TLB suffers changes when 
VM exit occurs, but unlike TLB, RSB includes 
addresses of RET instructions. 
Applying RSB to hypervisor detection was 
described by Bulygin (2008) and later by Fritsch 
(2008) and Athreya (2010). After 16 nested 
functions calls, RSB will consist of 16 
corresponding return addresses. The idea of the 
 detection lies in an attempt to fill the RSB buffer, 
call VM-exit, for example by calling an 
unconditionally intercepted instruction, measure 
an execution time of these 16 functions. If a 
hypervisor is present, it intercepts VM-Exit and 
replaces a part of RSB entries. As a result the 
whole duration will be longer than without a 
hypervisor. 
This method is vulnerable to the hypervisor’s 
countermeasures, for example if a hypervisor 
dispatcher has no sub-functions it is also 
vulnerable to time cheating attack (Athreya, 2010). 
2.4.3. Detection Based on Memory Access. A 
hypervisor can prevent its signature detection by 
controlling memory access (section 2.1.), which 
increases the duration of memory access and can 
be applied to hypervisor detection (Fisher-Ogden, 
2006; Fritsch, 2008). 
By walking successively through memory we 
measure each time the duration of memory page 
access. The memory region with excessive access 
duration is the stealth memory region. This region 
can consist of hypervisor dispatcher and 
corresponding structures. 
However, this method works only if the hypervisor 
does not use time cheating for self-protection. 
2.4.4. Detection by Unconditionally Intercepted 
Instructions. It is known that the duration of 
execution of unconditionally intercepted 
instructions increases after any hypervisor has 
been loaded in the system. We can detect 
hypervisor presence by comparing time duration 
with some threshold values (Athreya, 2010; 
Lakshminarayanan, Patel, Robinson, & Soulami, 
2012). 
Hardware virtualization for Intel CPU includes a 
set of unconditionally intercepted instructions, e. 
g. CPUID (Intel, 2014), for AMD CPU case we 
can use RDMSR (Morabito, 2012), which has to 
be triggered by a hypervisor. The authors suggest 
measuring a HDD access time, RAM access time 
or duration of cryptographic computation (Kyte, 
Zavarsky, Lindskog, & Ruhl, 2012; Pek, & 
Buttyan, 2014). But such events can only be 
revealed by specialized hypervisors and does not 
work in ordinary cases. 
This detection approach is vulnerable to “Blue 
Chicken” technique and time cheating 
(Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2008). Nevertheless, 
this approach appears to be the most attractive 
because of its usability and portability. This 
approach is also universal, as a hypervisor will 
always spend time on VM Exits (VM Entries), and 
this time needs to be hidden. Because of these 
advantages this approach was chosen and was 
significantly improved. 
2.5. Analysis of Counters to Measure 
Instruction Execution Time 
Instruction execution time (IET) or its duration is 
the main scope of this research, so let us classify 
and analyze the capabilities of the computer 
counters, which can be applied to measure, e.g. the 
execution time of ten CPUID instructions. 
Counters can be classified as software and 
hardware ones. Hardware counters use device 
capabilities and may be further classified as local 
and remote ones. 
The software counter (or SMP counter) is based on 
simultaneous work of two loops (Desnos et al., 
2011; Jian, Huaimin, Shize, & Bo, 2010; 
Morabito, 2012), which are running on different 
CPU cores. The first thread increments the control 
variable, while the second one executes the 
unconditionally intercepted instruction in the loop, 
for example 1000 times. The conclusion about 
hypervisor presence is made by comparing the 
results of a control variable with the threshold 
value. One paper (Li, Zhu, Zhou, & Wang, 2011) 
describes how to prevent this approach by 
applying memory modification, which contains the 
control variable. 
To measure IET we can use the following 
hardware counters TSC, RTC, ACPI Timer, APIC 
Timer, HPET, PIT, local device counters, e.g. 
GPU timer, and NTP-based clock. Our analysis 
shows that all these counters apart from TSC and 
SMP have low-resolution and cannot be used in 
ordinary cases. SMP counting requires no less than 
two CPU cores and can be cheated. The best 
choice to measure the IET is TSC because of its 
accuracy and high-resolution. TSC also works on 
all CPUs. To eliminate the influence of other 
running programs on IET, we can use TSC on the 
 highest IRQL and set the affinity of the measuring 
code with one of the CPU cores. 
The important advantage of TSC is the possibility 
to cheat on it easily, so we can simulate a stealthy 
hypervisor and test our detection approach in a 
real case. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that the existing 
approaches and hypervisor detection tools have the 
following drawbacks:  
1. Signature-based approaches are vulnerable to 
hypervisor countermeasures. Only Actaeon 
project can detect nested hypervisors, but it 
can also be compromised. 
2. Behavior-based detection methods do not 
reveal new hypervisors and do not work on 
new CPUs. 
3. Trusted hypervisor-based approach is 
susceptible to MITM attack. 
4. Time-based detection approaches are 
vulnerable to time cheating and Blue Chicken 
technique.  
Detection by unconditionally intercepted 
instructions is highly attractive, because it relies 
on a generally applicable technique. By improving 
data acquisition and processing, we can overcome 
the drawbacks of this method. 
3. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
ENHANCEMENT OF TIME-BASED 
DETECTION 
Detection by unconditionally intercepted 
instructions works well only if a hypervisor does 
not apply countermeasures: time cheating and 
temporary self-uninstalling. In this section the 
enhancement of this method is described. 
Our prerequisites are based on specific features of 
IET. One of them is the relation between the 
average IET and presence of a hypervisor. Another 
well-known one is a random nature of IET, but it 
is still unclear how to use it in practice. 
To grapple with this gap, let us look at the 
switching schemes between different CPU 
operating modes, which occur after OS is loaded. 
We demonstrate and analyze what actually 
happens when a set of CPUID instructions are 
being executed in three cases: when the hypervisor 
is present, not present and when several nested 
ones are present. 
Further we will focus on two IET characteristics: 
dispersion of IET array and IET array layering. 
According to some papers (Duflot, Etiemble, & 
Grumelard, 2006; Embleton, Sparks, & Zou, 2008; 
Zmudzinski, 2009) without a hypervisor a CPU 
can operate in one of the two modes: either in the 
Protected Mode (P-mode) or System Management 
Mode (S-mode), which is depicted on Figure 3, a. 
System Management Interrupt (SMI) switches 
from the P- to S-mode, CPU leaves S-mode and 
returns to the previous mode by using RSM 
instruction. 
We can conclude that CPU is a stochastic system 
with random transitions between states, because of 
a random nature of SMI. Therefore IET is a 
random value determined by the number of SMI.  
After the hypervisor is loaded the CPU can switch 
between the three modes. As in the previous case 
the P- and S- modes are present but an additional 
VMX root mode (V-mode) is added, so the 
P-mode is named as VMX non root mode (Intel, 
2014). The P-mode is accepted as the main one, 
S-mode is duplicated for better clarity, see 
Figure 3, b. Execution of each CPUID instruction 
in P-mode always leads to switching to the V-
mode (VM Exit), and after execution it switches 
back to the P-mode. Switching to the S-mode 
might occur either from P-mode or from V-mode. 
Similarly to the previous case we may assume that 
CPU works as a stochastic system, but switching 
to the V-mode enhances its random nature. As a 
result switching increases the average value of IET 
as well as the variability of IET.  
 
 
  
 
a b 
Figure 3 Switching between Modes in Two Cases: (a) without a Hypervisor, (b) with One Hypervisor 
 
CPU works in a similar way in cases when several 
hypervisors are present (Ben-Yehuda et al., 2010). 
CPU can also switch between three modes, but the 
situation will be different because of several 
hypervisors dispatchers, see Figure 4. 
In this case execution of each CPUID instructions 
in P-mode always leads to switching to the V-
mode, and further, each hypervisor’s dispatcher is 
successively called beginning from dispatcher #1 
to dispatcher #2 etc. to dispatcher #e and 
backwards. Finally execution will switch to P-
mode. S-mode can gain control at any point. Now, 
CPU also works as a stochastic system, but 
participation  
of several nested dispatchers significantly 
lengthens the time of execution and increases IET 
variability. These schemes allow us to discover 
that the root of randomness of IET is actually the 
randomness of SMI. 
Suppose that probability or frequency of SMI is  
a constant. After a hypervisor is loaded, due to the 
increased IET the number of SMI is increased as 
well. That is why the dispersion of IET will 
increase after a hypervisor is loaded and this fact 
can be used for detection. During the execution of 
a set of CPUID the number of SMI is limited. If 
we repeat measuring of IET in a loop we can see 
that some of its values are repeated. Hence array 
of IET values can be grouped by sets with the 
same values (for details see Chapter 4). As a 
result, we can see that the array of IET values has 
a layered nature in all described cases. The 
number of layers will increase after a hypervisor is 
loaded and this fact can also be used for 
hypervisor detection. 
The revealed IET variability indexes, variance  
(or second moment) and number of layers  
(or spectral width) are resilient to time cheating. 
Hypervisor can only decrease the mean value of 
IET but not the variability characteristics. 
As a first approximation this analysis reveals two 
theoretical hypervisor indicators. This result is 
based on a hypothesis but now has to be 
comprehensively verified by experiments.  
 
 
Figure 4 Switching between Modes with Several Nested Hypervisors 
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 4. INSTRUCTION EXECUTION TIME 
RESEARCH & NEW STEALTH 
HYPERVISORS DETECTION 
ALGORITHMS 
Probabilistic hypervisor detection is discussed in 
following papers (Desnos et al., 2011; Fritsch, 
2008; Jian et al., 2010; Morabito, 2012). All these 
methods work only if a hypervisor is not hiding 
itself. What is more, these papers do not give 
enough attention to the random nature of IET. 
Detection of stealthy hypervisors faces two 
challenges: time cheating and data fluctuations, 
which will be described in this paper. 
4.1. Experiments on Measurements of 
Instruction Execution Time 
To detect a hypervisor we improve the detection 
method, which uses unconditionally intercepted 
instructions. We analyze IET sets in the two cases 
with a hypervisor and without any. 
Experimental data was received by measuring a 
set of ten CPUID instructions by using RDTSC in  
a loop in Windows driver, see Figure 5. To 
dismiss the influence of other apps and drivers in 
the OS we ensured thread affinity with certain 
CPU core and raise IRQL to its maximum level. It 
is also possible to use deferred procedure call 
(DPC) to achieve an exclusive access to the 
hardware. An example of this scheme is described 
by Blunden (2012). 
We use CPUID instruction as an unconditionally 
intercepted one by any Intel-based hypervisor and 
also as a serializing instruction which prevents 
out-of-order execution (Fog, 2014; Intel, 1998). 
Our proof-of-concept hypervisor (PoC hypervisor) 
is based on the VMM framework by Embleton 
(2007) with an added TSC cheating function. 
There are three different ways to cheat TSC: by 
TSC_OFFSET field in VMCS, catching execution 
of RDTSC or CPUID. We chose the last one: our 
hypervisor decreases the TSC's value every time 
CPUID is executed. This hypervisor's dispatcher is 
the smallest. By cheating TSC we can make sure 
that the average values of IET are the same to 
within one clock tick, whether the hypervisor is 
present or not. Therefore, this is the most complex 
case for detection. 
To obtain data we used two nested loops. An 
example of an inner loop is shown on Figure 5, it 
was executed 1000 times without any delays. 
Outer loop was executed 10 times with a two-
second delay between each iteration. The results of 
this experiment were recorded to a 1000x10 array 
(see Table 1); the columns contain data from inner 
loops.  
According to ISO 5725 repeatability requirements 
we repeated the complete experiment five times 
with a two-second delay between each iteration. 
To control reproducibility of data we checked the 
results on 10 different days. All in all for this 
period we measured 50 arrays of 1000x10, which 
will be further processed. That period was 
sufficient to reduce variation intervals of statistics: 
average values, variance etc. 
Six PCs were involved in testing, see Table 2. In 
the first five PCs we used our PoC hypervisor, and 
in the last PC we used a specialized hypervisor 
loaded by BIOS – TRace EXplorer (TREX) by 
Tichonov and Avetisyan (2011). 
 
Figure 5 Code Fragment for Obtaining Data 
 
KeSetSystemAffinityThread(affinity)
KfRaiseIrql(HIGH_LEVEL)
for (...)
{
RDTSC
MOV hst, EDX
MOV lst, EAX
CPUID // 1
...
CPUID // 10
RDTSC
MOV hfin, EDX
MOV lfin, EAX
save_time(hst, lst, hfin, lfin)
}
 Table 1 Example of Array of Measured IET without a Hypervisor 
Measurement no 
Inner loop iteration 
1 2 … 10 
1 2896 2888 … 2896 
2 2896 2888 … 2880 
… … … … … 
1000 2888 2888 … 2888 
Average of a column 2895 2888 … 2888 
Variance of a column 1738 1267 … 1196 
 
 
Table 2 CPU Models and OS Versions 
PC# CPU models and OS versions 
1 Intel Core 2 Duo E6300 / Windows 7 
2 Intel Core 2 Duo E8200 / Windows 7 
3 Intel Core 2 Duo E8600 / Windows Live CD XP 
4 Intel Core i7 950 / Windows XP 
5 Intel Xeon X5600 / Windows 7 
6 AMD Phenom X4 945 / Windows Live CD XP 
 
4.2. Probabilistic Nature of Instruction 
Execution Time 
Desnos, Filiol and Lefou (2011) suggested that the 
instruction execution time is normally distributed 
and there are no problems with precision 
(repeatability and reproducibility) of the 
measurement data. 
However, all our experiments on different PCs 
showed that the measurement data are non-
normally distributed. There are no well-known 
distribution patterns which these data would 
match. Moreover, data fluctuation is so large that 
mean and variance statistics differ significantly 
between sets of experiments. Therefore the 
precision of the measurement data does not 
comply with ISO 5725 (2004) requirements.  
We have to take into consideration that outliers 
and jumps (discontinuity) are very common, 
which will alter statistical values, see Figure 6. A 
possible reason for outliers and jumps is the 
pipeline of instructions. Due to the fact that the 
time measurement procedure is quite simple and a 
PoC hypervisor with time cheating can be used, 
we can receive an abundance of experimental data 
for research and detection phase, which 
significantly helps. Relying on the probabilistic 
nature of IET we dealt with when setting up 
experiments, these revealed data peculiarities, 
processing of preliminary data, only appeared after 
that we applied statistical methods. 
4.3. Peculiarities of Instruction Execution Time 
and Ways of Hypervisors Detection  
Our experiments confirmed the following:  
1. IET measured by TSC is a random value, 
which depends on a CPU model, OS version 
and on whether or not a hypervisor is present. 
2. The average and variance of IET arrays are 
larger if a hypervisor is present than if it is not. 
3. The difference between average and variance 
of IET arrays becomes more significant after 
every new nested hypervisor has been loaded. 
We can easily and reliably detect a non-hidden 
hypervisor by just comparing the average values 
of IET arrays. The average values of IET arrays 
with a non-hidden hypervisor are almost 10 times 
larger than without it.  
 
  
Figure 6 Scatter Plot of IET Array Fragment with One Outlier and Jump 
 
But a hypervisor can apply time cheating 
technique and as a result the average values of IET 
will be the same as corresponding values without a 
hypervisor. There are no time-based detection 
methods which work well under such 
circumstances. Our experiments were focused on 
this challenging case. 
Using more common statistical methods in 
hypervisor detection proved to be inapplicable. 
The reasons will be given below. 
By using statistics we can determine if there is a 
statistically significant difference between two sets 
of data. We already know which of the set will be 
measured with exposure and without it. 
But in the current situation we have several sets. 
We can connect several sets to a big one, and use 
classical approaches, but such operation has to be 
proved. For this case there are no proven statistical 
methods. 
Applying current approaches to determine 
significant difference between the sets did not 
yield any positive results for a variety of reasons. 
We can consider the columns of arrays as a 
random sample, also as a result of the random 
process. It is impossible to use the first method, 
because of the fluctuation of measurements and 
lack of homogeneity. The second method is not 
applicable either, because of overlapping variation 
intervals and instability of characteristics. 
We see that homogeneity of variances (HOV) is 
violated in all our experimental data, and as a 
result we cannot use analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) in data processing.  
We conclude that methods of parametric and non-
parametric statistics are not applicable in the 
current situation. That is why we developed the 
following methods, including the present author’s 
approaches: 
1. Low-frequency filtration. 
2. Calculation of experimental probability. 
3. Two-step way to calculate statistics. 
4. Variation interval as confidence interval. 
5. Iteration of measurements if the statistical 
value is at the intersection of two variation 
intervals. 
Due to filtration we can decrease fluctuation and 
stabilize variation characteristics. 
Due to calculation of experimental probability we 
can find threshold values and so minimize type I 
and II errors. 
We choose a two-step way of calculating in order 
to reduce overlapping of these characteristic 
intervals. 
To calculate a confidence interval we choose the 
idea of the confidence interval method of Strelen 
(2004) and Kornfeld (1965), in which a confidence 
interval is calculated as a variation interval or 
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 difference between maximum (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥) and 
minimum (𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛) values of statistic. The 
confidence level is the following 𝑃{𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≪ 𝜃 <
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥} = 1 − 0.5
𝑛−1, where ‘𝑛’ is the length of a 
sample. 
We have to study a situation when a calculated 
statistical value will be at the intersection of two 
variation intervals. In this situation it is impossible 
to decide whether a hypervisor is present or not. In 
this case we have to repeat measurements of IET 
arrays and calculations of statistics. In accordance 
with the multiplication theorem recurrent hits in 
the intersection zone are very unlikely.  
4.3.1. Applying Layered Structure of IET 
Arrays to Hypervisors Detection. Numerous 
experiments show that IET arrays have a layered 
structure. It means that each IET array is 
comprised of several layers, whose characteristics 
depend on CPU, OS and whether or not a 
hypervisor is present.  
First of all our experiments confirm, that the 
number of layers with a hypervisor is larger than 
without a hypervisor.  
To make it clear, the results of an experiment are 
given below. We measured IET arrays in two 
cases: without hypervisor and with it.  
The right part of Figure 7 is a scatter plot of the 
IET array; each point corresponding to the 
measured duration of ten CPUID instructions. 
Experiment numbers are on the x-axis, while IET 
values are displayed on the y-axis.  
Blue color corresponds to IET without a 
hypervisor, red color corresponds to IET with a 
hypervisor, which is applying time cheating. This 
technique leads to getting approximately the same 
mean value if hypervisor is present with the mean 
value without a hypervisor. 
The left part of Figure 7 shows the corresponding 
frequency polygons or relative frequency chart. 
We can see that with a hypervisor the number of 
polygon points (or number of layers) is larger than 
without a hypervisor.  
The similar nature of polygons was also noted by 
Morabito (2012). His observations show that the 
data is generally not normally distributed and 
skewed, long-tailed data with outliers is fairly 
common. Similar plots of IET array fragments are 
given in the paper by Fritsch (2008) in the part 
“A.4 Empirical results” and by Li, Zhu, Zhou, & 
Wang (2011). However, the fact that layered 
structure could be used for hypervisor detection 
had not been mentioned. 
If several hypervisors are present, the layering 
structure of IET arrays is still obvious. We 
measured IET arrays in four different cases: 
without hypervisor (black), with only own PoC 
hypervisor (green), with only Acronis hypervisor 
(blue) and with two nested hypervisors (red). The 
scatter plots of the corresponding IET arrays are 
shown on Figure 8.  
To make it clear, the scatter plots are spaced 
vertically. We can see that without a hypervisor 
the plot consists of only one line with quite rare 
jumps. If PoC hypervisor is present, the 
corresponding plot has 2-3 layers with significant 
jumps. The situation is similar if only Acronis 
hypervisor is present. If two nested hypervisors are 
present we can see that the plot becomes a cloud 
of points, there are a lot of layers with low 
frequency.  
The best way to reveal the number of layers is to 
use the frequency distribution of measured IET 
arrays. We calculate frequency distribution with 
each class for one value or without intervals of 
numbers. Number of layers equals the number of 
classes. 
It is possible to detect a stealth hypervisor, which 
uses the Blue Chicken technique. Temporary 
self-uninstalling of this hypervisor originally 
occurs after 50-100 measurements of IET because 
hypervisor needs to recognize time-based 
detection. As a result we will see the changed 
nature of the scatter plot: the first 50-100 
measurements will have a layered nature and the 
remaining portion of measurements will have just 
1-2 layers because the hypervisor has already been 
uninstalled. This changing of the scatter plot will 
be repeated in the next columns; because they 
were measured with a two-second delay. 
However, our experiments show that direct use of 
these indicators is problematic for two reasons. 
These characteristics are not always constant (they 
are unstable) and also variation ranges of these 
characteristics overlap each other whether 
 hypervisor is present or not. Later we will discuss how to deal with it. 
 
Figure 7 Scatter Plots of IET Arrays Fragments and Corresponding Frequency Polygons 
 
 
Figure 8 Scatter Plots of IET Arrays Fragments in Four Different Cases 
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4.3.2. Applying Second and Fourth Moments to 
Hypervisors Detection. All our experiments also 
confirmed the following result of section 3. After 
hypervisor is loaded the numerical values that 
measure the spread of IET arrays will increase. 
We obtained good results with the second and 
fourth moments. Moreover, after loading each 
nested hypervisor these sample characteristics 
increase, which is clearly seen in Figure 8. 
Experiments show that the sixth and higher 
moments of IET arrays are seriously inaccurate. 
As mentioned before, outliers and jumps 
(discontinuity) significantly affected values of the 
second and fourth moments. That is why it is 
impossible to achieve a stable distinction between 
sample characteristics and draw a conclusion as to 
whether a hypervisor is present or not. Negative 
impacts of these factors can be eliminated by 
simultaneously applying three techniques: fitting, 
low-frequency filtering and “length-averaging”. 
We get sample characteristics before and after an 
outlier and calculate the final value by averaging 
of the corresponding fragments lengths for 
“length-averaging”. 
In order to reduce overlapping of these 
characteristics intervals we chose a two-step way 
of calculating. We calculate the second and fourth 
moments for each column in the table (IET array), 
see Table 1. This brings us to a set of these 
characteristics, which we consider as a new 
sample and repeatedly calculate characteristics of 
this set. 
In other words, from the primary column of IET 
array we get the secondary characteristics, which 
we are processes by statistical methods. 
Consequently this helps us to significantly reduce 
or avoid the overlapping of new characteristics 
intervals. 
All theoretical principles from Section 3 were 
successfully confirmed by experiment. The 
number of layers of IET arrays, second and fourth 
moments increased and remained on the same 
increased level after a new hypervisor was loaded, 
i.e. they can be used to detect a hypervisor and 
several nested ones. Moreover the ways of 
calculating threshold values of each statistic will 
be given with due consideration of data 
fluctuations. 
4.4. How to Calculate Threshold Values of 
Statistics to Detect Hypervisors 
Hypervisor detection includes comparison of 
calculated statistics values with threshold values. 
If statistical values are greater than threshold 
values, we conclude that a hypervisor is present, 
otherwise there is no hypervisor. The main goal is 
to find a suitable filtration level and the statistic, 
which has an appropriate threshold value or 
minimal sum of type I and type II errors. 
To calculate threshold values we have to measure 
50 arrays 1000x10 for two cases when a 
hypervisor is present or not, 100 arrays in total. 
We use own PoC hypervisor, because it contains 
the minimal set of instructions in CPUID 
dispatcher and its only role is TSC cheating. This 
is the most difficult case. PoC hypervisor’s 
threshold values will help to detect any other 
hypervisor with more functions, as it will cause 
more changes to IET variation.  
Calculating threshold values includes calculating 
statistics in two ways after low frequency filtering 
with the following levels {0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 
0.2} or {0%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%}. 
One way is to calculate statistics for each column 
1000x1 of a 1000x10 array. After this calculation 
we analyzed the received set of 10 values as a new 
sample and then averaged them (𝑙 ̅ – “averaged 
columns value”). 
Another way is to calculate statistics for one big 
column 10,000x1 obtained from an array 1000x10 
by vectorizing (Vectorization (mathematics), 
2014) (𝑙𝑣 – “vectorized array value”). 
It should not be forgotten that outliers and jumps 
(discontinuity) significantly change statistics 
values and therefore we have to delete them. We 
find a jump as the maximum value in the first 
order difference (The Scipy Community, 2009). 
The threshold value of a jump is 300 CPU ticks, 
which can then be corrected.  
The calculation algorithm of threshold values is 
the same for all statistics and includes three steps: 
 1. Receive and process IET array every day. 
Receive preliminary results. 
2. Process the preliminary results which are 
obtained for 10 days. Receive threshold values 
and probabilities of type I and II error. 
3. Create the final table with all appropriate 
statistics. 
We are going to describe a way to calculate 
threshold values of a new statistic – a number of 
layers. 
The first step is to filter each column from Table 1 
with different filtration levels. For each received 
column we calculate the number of layers. 
Calculated values are given in corresponding 
columns in Table 3. 
The last but one column in Table 3 includes the 
mean values of the number of layers for each 
filtration level. For example the first value 12 is 
(28+29+...+10)/10. The last column includes the 
values of the number of layers, which were 
calculated from the column 10,000x1 for each 
filtration level. E.g. the first value 53 means the 
number of layers in the array 10,000x1 after its 
filtration with level 0%. 
 
Table 3 Example of Calculating the Number of Layers If no Hypervisor is Present 
Filtering 
level 
Values of the number of layers 
for each column in array 
1000x10 
Averaged 
columns value, 
𝑙 ̅
Vectorized 
array value, 𝑙𝑣 
1 2 … 10 
0 28 29 … 10 12 53 
0.02 4 3 … 3 4 6 
0.05 3 3 … 3 3 6 
0.1 2 2 … 3 3 3 
0.15 1 2 … 2 2 3 
0.2 1 2 … 2 2 2 
 
Table 4 Number of Layers of IET Arrays for 2 Cases when a Hypervisor is Present and not 
Code of 
experiments 
No hypervisor Hypervisor is present 
Averaged 
columns value, 𝑙 ̅
Vectorized 
array value, 𝑙𝑣 
Averaged 
columns value, 𝑙 ̅
Vectorized 
array value, 𝑙𝑣 
day #1 (Ig10) 
5 23 11 47 
4 18 11 52 
4 15 10 34 
5 21 13 53 
4 15 14 68 
 
 
... … … … 
day #10 (Ig19) 
4 20 19 102 
6 32 15 77 
6 32 16 79 
6 32 20 88 
10 50 21 105 
Variation intervals [4, 14] [10, 110] [8, 21] [29,105] 
Threshold values ≤ 7 ≤ 32 ≥ 8 ≥ 33 
Type I error 0.04 0.12 – – 
Type II error 0 0.16 – – 
 
 We can see that with filtration level “0.1” 
the values of 𝑙 ̅ and 𝑙𝑣 are stabilized, therefore we 
will use this filtration level for this PC in the 
future. The similar table is also created if PoC 
hypervisor is present. Four numbers, values 𝑙 ̅ and 
𝑙𝑣 in two cases when a hypervisor is present or not 
present, are evaluated from a single 1000x10 array 
in each case. 
This procedure was repeated for each of five 
arrays 1000x10 every day, for 10 days. 
After that we create a preliminary table with 
threshold values and type I and II errors, see 
Table 4. 
Stabilization of statistics is obvious in both cases 
when a hypervisor is present and not. We managed 
to achieve this stabilization only due to filtration 
of jumps and length-averaging, as previously 
mentioned. 
Variation intervals were determined according to 
minimum and maximum values of the statistics in 
the columns. Variation intervals overlap, therefore 
if statistical values get into this overlapping, it is 
impossible to reliably detect a hypervisor. In these 
cases we have to repeat IET array measurements. 
We chose threshold values so that the sum of 
probability of type I and II errors was minimal. 
Type I error means that we conclude that the 
hypervisor is there according to calculations, while 
actually it is not there. The probability of a 
type I error is experimentally calculated as a 
number of values, which are greater than the 
threshold value. A type II error means that we 
conclude that the hypervisor is not there, while 
actually it is there. The probability of this error is 
also experimentally calculated as a number of 
values, which is smaller than the threshold value. 
In other words, we calculate the probability of 
type I and II errors with this formula 𝑟 𝑔⁄  , where 
‘𝑟’ is the number of values in the column, which 
are outside the threshold, 𝑔 = 50 is the total 
number of values in the column. For detection we 
used only those statistics, whose sum of type I and 
II errors are less than 0.2 (or 20%).  
Below is a fragment of the final table (Table 5) 
with all appropriate statistics for all tested PCs 
from Table 2.  
?̅? is the average value of IET from all arrays 
without a hypervisor and all other statistical 
notations are below in Table 6. As mentioned 
above we can calculate the statistics in two ways: 
for each column and after vectorization.  
Our research findings suggest that threshold values 
depend on Windows version. For the same 
hardware threshold values for Windows XP and 
Windows 7 are different, variation intervals of 
statistics on Windows XP are smaller than on 
Windows 7. This occurs because Windows 7 
enables more SMI handlers than Windows XP. 
We performed similar experimental checks for 
nested hypervisors. We used the following 
iteration algorithm: 
1. First, we obtained threshold values for the 
case without a hypervisor. To do this we 
measured IET arrays without a hypervisor and 
with our PoC hypervisor. We received that 
𝐿 ≤ 31 (number of layers) means there is no 
hypervisor. The probability of a false positive 
is 0.14. 𝐿 ≥ 32 means a hypervisor is present. 
The probability of false negative is 0.06. 
2. Secondly, we installed Acronis Disk Director, 
which loaded its own hypervisor. In the same 
way we obtained threshold values for this 
case. To do this we measured IET arrays with 
only the Acronis hypervisor and with two 
nested hypervisors: PoC and Acronis. We 
found out that 𝐿 ≤ 67 or more precisely 
32 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 67 means that only the Acronis 
hypervisor is present. 𝐿 ≥ 86 means that two 
nested hypervisors simultaneously work. 
Probabilities of type I and II errors in the latter 
case is 0. 
Table 7 includes the threshold values for all 
mentioned cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 Final Table with all Appropriate Statistics  
PC Statistics 
Filtration 
level 
Threshold values Probability 
No 
hypervisor 
Hypervisor 
is present 
Type I 
error 
Type II 
error 
1 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2911 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 7 ≥ 8  0.04 0 
?̅?  0 ≤ 14 ≥ 18 0.02 0 
?̅?  0.1 ≤ 679 ≥ 947 0.02 0 
𝜇  0.1 ≤ 104161 ≥ 111041 0.02 0.10 
2 
?̅? 0 ≤ 2492 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 11 ≥ 12 0.1 0.06 
?̅?  0.2 ≤ 100 ≥ 101 0.08 0.1 
?̅?  0.2 ≤ 168 ≥ 13030 0.14 0.02 
3 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2431 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 6 ≥ 8 0 0 
?̅?  0.1 ≤ 15 ≥ 41 0 0 
𝜇  0.1 ≤ 609 ≥ 3410 0 0 
4 
?̅?  0 ≤ 5018 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 22 ≥ 26 0.02 0.02 
?̅?  0.1 ≤ 177 ≥ 181 0.1 0.1 
5 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2852 – – – 
?̅?  0 ≤ 67 ≥ 71 0.04 0 
?̅?  0 ≤ 16416 ≥ 48920 0 0 
6 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2126 – – – 
?̅?  0 ≤ 34 ≥ 241 0 0 
𝑙 ̅ 0 ≤ 134 ≥ 593 0 0 
?̅?  0 ≤ 216 ≥ 5478 0 0 
𝑑 0 ≤ 345 ≥ 5422 0 0 
?̅?  0,02 ≤ 54 ≥ 956 0 0 
 
Table 6 Statistical Notations 
 Averaged columns value Vectorized array value 
Number of layers ?̅? 𝑙 
2
nd
 central moment  ?̅? 𝑑 
4
th
 central moment ?̅? 𝜇 
 
4.5. Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors  
According to experiments the detection  
of hypervisors goes in two stages: through 
preliminary and operational stages, see Table 8. 
First of all we have to make sure that there is no 
hypervisor in BIOS. To achieve this we 
update/flash BIOS with a known and trusted 
image. Malware in BIOS can prevent its updating 
by software utility. That is why the best way to 
overwrite BIOS is to desolder a microchip from 
the motherboard, flash it by hardware programmer 
and solder it back (Muchychka, 2013).  
 
 Table 7 Threshold Values for Two Nested Hypervisors 
Threshold 
values 
Conclusion about hypervisors and 
their numbers 
Type I error Type II error 
𝐿 ≤ 31 No hypervisor 0.14 0 
32 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 67 Only Acronis hypervisor is present 0 0.06 
𝐿 ≥ 86 Two nested hypervisors are present 0 0 
 
 
Table 8 Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors 
Stages Stage description 
Preliminary 
1. Flash BIOS with a trusted image or firmware. 
2. Install OS. 
3. Get threshold values for no hypervisor case. 
Operational 
(detection) 
4. Check in a loop if a hypervisor is present. 
5. Install supplementary software (optional). 
6. Monitor messages about a hypervisor presence. 
7. To adapt the tool to new legitimate hypervisor go to 3. 
 
In the second step we install OS. We have to use 
official images to be certain that OS images do not 
include any malware or illegitimate hypervisors. 
Additionally OS components may be checked, e.g. 
by reverse-engineering.  
In the third step we get threshold values by using 
PoC hypervisor. This step was described above.  
In the fourth step we run the hypervisor presence 
check in an infinite loop. We measure IET arrays 
in a loop and compare calculated statistics with 
threshold values, which were calculated in step 3. 
We successively check if a hypervisor is present 
on each CPU physical core. 
On the fifth and sixth steps we install 
supplementary software and monitor messages 
about new hypervisors.  
If we get a message about new hypervisors after a 
program installation, we check if this hypervisor is 
legitimate. The approaches how to do this are 
beyond the scope of this paper. It may be noted 
that we can do it by calling corresponding support 
service etc. Once we conclude that the hypervisor 
is legitimate, we have to adapt the detection tool 
by obtaining new threshold values (step 3). If we 
conclude that the hypervisor is illegitimate, it must 
be removed from the system. In some cases this is 
solved by just uninstalling the previously installed 
program. However in more complicated cases we 
have to check all the system components including 
the BIOS image. 
All source codes of getting threshold values, PoC 
hypervisor and detection tool are here 
(Korkin, 2014). The tool for getting threshold 
values consists of two parts: subsystem for IET 
arrays acquisition (C++) and subsystem for 
threshold values calculation (MATLAB). PoC 
hypervisor was developed using С++ and ASM, 
and it is compiled with Visual Studio. The 
detection tool consists of two parts: subsystem for 
IET arrays acquisition and subsystem for threshold 
values checks by MATLAB. 
5. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
1. Hypervisor detection is a well-known 
challenge. Malware with hypervisor facilities 
are serious information security threats. Many 
authors and companies are trying to tackle this 
challenge. 
2. In this paper we focused on and improved 
time based detection by unconditionally 
intercepted instructions. We studied the case 
when a hypervisor uses time cheating and 
temporary self-uninstalling to prevent its 
detection. For this situation appropriate time 
 based approaches are not available on the 
Internet. Only the described methods are able 
to detect stealthy hypervisors in all known 
countermeasures: time-cheating etc. 
3. We explored the probability characteristics of 
instruction execution time and proposed a new 
technique for the detection of a hypervisor and 
several nested ones. 
4. We developed techniques for calculating 
threshold values of various statistics and a 
step-by-step guide on how to detect a 
hypervisor. 
5. These methods work well on different PCs 
with both Intel and AMD CPUs and detected 
PoC hypervisor and special BIOS hypervisor.  
5.1. Hypervisor Detection without Flashing 
BIOS and Reinstalling OS 
The proposed hypervisor detection method (or its 
preliminary starting procedure) needs to stop 
system activity to flash BIOS, reinstall OS etc. But 
for some systems this interruption of work is 
prohibited or impossible. However, on the basic of 
our experimental results, we can guarantee no 
hypervisor presence without performing 1-2 steps 
and unwanted system shutdown. To achieve this 
we acquire IET arrays on PC, which is already in 
operation. If after IET arrays filtering step we get 
1-2 stable layers, this will mean that there is no 
hypervisor. This peculiarity occurs on PCs with 
Windows XP and should be investigated further. 
5.2. Applying Numerical Values of Layers for 
Hypervisor Detection  
We have discovered another pattern which can be 
used to detect a hypervisor. Thus most of our 
experiments numerical values of layers are unique. 
For example, in Figure 7 we see that numerical 
values of different layers after filtering indicate 
hypervisor presence. We achieve the following 
numerical values of layers without hypervisor 
{2160, 2168, 2184, 2192, 2200, 2478, 2480, 2880, 
2888, 2904, 2920, 2936} and these values {2876, 
2884, 2892, 2900, 2908, 2916, 2924} with PoC 
hypervisor. We see that these two sets do not 
contain equal values. Moreover, if a hypervisor 
cheats TSC so that the first members from each set 
are equal, the second and the next members from 
the above sets will differ. This happens because of 
the differences of deltas in each set {8, 24, 32, 40, 
318, 320, 720, 728, 744, 760, 776} and {8, 16, 24, 
32, 40, 48}. 
The reasons for this difference and its resilience to 
hypervisor countermeasures requires further 
research. 
5.3. Ways to Develop Computer Forensics and 
Statistics for Universities 
The proposed statistical methods and tools for 
hypervisor detection can be used in two different 
disciplines. Firstly, it may become a part of 
Computer Forensics Discipline, when students can 
acquire practical skills working with hardware 
virtualization technology. PoC hypervisor can be 
used as a basic platform for further improvements; 
for example to create an event tracing tool which 
will monitor low-level events and will be resilient 
to modern malware. Hypervisor detection tools 
can be used to invent new detection approaches, 
based for example on all unconditionally 
intercepted instructions (CPUID, INVD, MOV 
from/to CR3, all VMX instructions, RDMSR and 
WRMSR). These may have different parameters, 
including wrong or invalid parameters, as well as 
profiling execution time for different sets and 
sequences of instructions, not just ten CPUIDs as 
is described in this paper. Analysis of time of 
physical memory access can be applied to find 
time anomalies due to possible hidden objects. 
Such a detection approach may need checking all 
the memory pages, including valid and invalid 
addresses. We compare IET characteristics before 
and after disabling the CPU’s cache control 
mechanism. A stealth hypervisor has to cheat TSC 
with different deltas for each case, which does not 
always occur. 
Secondly it may become a part of a course in 
“Statistics and Data Analysis”. Because of its 
opportunity to acquire a lot of real experimental 
data sets students can acquire practical experience 
of data processing and its analysis. They can learn 
how to solve repeatability and reproducibility 
problems. They can apply different statistical 
criteria to test correlations between arrays for 
different cases: with a hypervisor and without it. 
As a result students will not only better understand 
the theoretical materials of the course, but will 
also acquire new practical skills and apply them in 
their own research. 
 5.4. Applying Hidden BIOS Hypervisor to 
Track Stolen Laptops 
It is well known that an organization has to pay 
heavily every time an employee’s laptop is lost or 
stolen. The idea is to create a software agent which 
will track a laptop, block it if it is stolen, control it 
remotely etc. This tool will work like Computrace 
LoJack by Absolute Software (2014). The key 
moment is to create a software agent, which will 
be really hard to detect, delete and block. By using 
hardware virtualization technology we can create a 
hypervisor, which works permanently. To 
guarantee that autorun works well, it will be 
loaded from BIOS. This hypervisor can hide 
memory areas and prevent its own rewriting by 
software tools with the help of Shadow Page 
Tables for AMD CPUs or Extended Page Tables 
for Intel CPUs. This hypervisor can be easily 
planted in any PC which supports hardware 
virtualization. To facilitate development of this 
hypervisor we can use open source software 
components, for example Coreboot (2014) for 
BIOS firmware, TianoCore (2014) for UEFI and 
XEN (The Xen Project, 2014) as a basis for this 
hypervisor. 
5.5. Applying Hypervisor as USB Firewall to 
prevent BadUSB attack 
Nohl and Lell (2014) presented an idea and 
prototype of malware USB stick. The idea lies in 
reprogramming a USB device in order to add new 
unauthorized functions. As a result, for example, a 
reprogrammed USB stick will work as a USB 
keyboard and by running malware commands can 
take over a computer. This vulnerability is really 
serious because this USB device works 
transparently for user and AVs and formatting 
USB flash does not erase malware firmware.  
We can solve this challenge by using a 
hypervisor’s facilities, which will control all the 
devices access to the PC. By applying manual 
configuration mode the hypervisor can block 
malware activities of such devices. It will look as 
if a hypervisor is playing the role of a USB 
firewall. For example, after a USB device plugs 
into the computer port the hypervisor will display 
the list of all registered devices and allow the user 
to choose the appropriate position. After that the 
hypervisor will control the work of all USB 
devices according to the access policies of these 
devices. As a result this hypervisor working as 
USB firewall can guarantee protection of PCs 
from BadUSB attack or other malware USB 
devices.  
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank Andrey Chechulin, Ph.D 
research fellow of Laboratory of Computer 
Security Problems of the St. Petersburg Institute 
for Informatics and Automation of the Russian 
Academy of Science (Scientific advisor – Prof. 
Igor Kotenko) for his insightful comments and 
feedback which helped us to uplift the quality of 
the paper substantially. 
I would like to thank Iwan Nesterov, head of the 
department of mathematical methods of cyber 
security, LLC “CSS Security”, Moscow, Russia 
for his invaluable contribution and support. 
I would also like to thank Ben Stein, teacher of 
English, Kings College, London, UK for his 
invaluable corrections of the paper. 
I am grateful to my grandfather Peter Prokoptsev, 
Ph.D, Kirovograd, Ukraine for his help with 
statistics and data analysis. 
7. AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY 
Igor Korkin, Ph.D has been in cyber security since 
2009. He works at the Moscow Engineering & 
Physics Institute, training post-graduate students 
and supervising students. Research interests 
include: rootkits and anti-rootkits technologies. 
Took part at the CDFSL in 2014. 
8. REFERENCES 
[1] Absolute Software (2014). Theft Recovery 
Software for Laptops, Mac, Smartphones and 
Tablets – Absolute Lojack. Retrieved on 
October 12, 2014, from 
http://lojack.absolute.com/en/products/absolut
e-lojack 
[2] Accord. (2010). Trusted Startup Hardware 
Module. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://www.okbsapr.ru/akk_amdz_en.html 
[3] AMD. (2011). Revision Guide for AMD NPT 
Family 0Fh Processors. Technical Report, 
Publication Number 33610, Revision 3.48. 
 [4] AMD. (2013). AMD64 Architecture 
Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System 
Programming. Technical Report, Publication 
Number 24593, Revision 3.23. 
[5] Athreya, B. (2010, August). Subverting Linux 
On-The-Fly Using Hardware Virtualization 
Technology (Master’s thesis). Georgia 
Institute of Technology. Atlanta, GA, USA. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/3484
4 
[6] Barbosa, E. (2007). Detecting of Hardware 
Virtualization Rootkits. Paper presented at the 
Symposium on Security for Asia Network 
(SyScan), Singapore. 
[7] Barrett, D., & Kipper, G. (2010). 
Virtualization and Forensics: a Digital 
Forensic Investigator’s Guide to Virtual 
Environments. Amsterdam, Netherlands: 
Syngress/Elsevier. 
[8] Berger, S., Caceres, R., Goldman, K., Perez, 
R., Sailer, R., & Doorn, L. (2006,  
July 31 - August 4). vTPM: Virtualizing the 
Trusted Platform Module. Proceedings of the 
15th conference on USENIX Security 
Symposium (USENIX-SS), 305–320, 
Vancouver, BC, Canada. 
[9] Ben-Yehuda, M., Day, M., Dubitzky, Z., 
Factor, M., HarEl, N., Gordon, A., Liguori, 
A., Wasserman, O., & Yassour, B. (2010, 
October 4-6). The Turtles Project: Design and 
Implementation of Nested Virtualization. 
Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference 
on Operating Systems Design and 
Implementation (OSDI), 423-436, Vancouver, 
BC, Canada. 
[10] Ben-Yehuda, M. (2013). Machine 
Virtualization: Efficient Hypervisors, Stealthy 
Malware. Muli Ben-Yehuda Homepage. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://www.mulix.org/lectures/vmsecurity/vm
sec-cyberday13.pdf 
[11] Blunden, B. (2012). The Rootkit arsenal: 
Escape and evasion in the dark corners of the 
system. (2nd ed.). Burlington, MA: Jones & 
Bartlett Publishers. 
[12] BluePillStudy. (2010). Learn the Open Source 
of Blue Pill Project. Project Hosting on 
Google Code. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from https://code.google.com/p/bluepillstudy 
[13] Brossard, J., & Demetrescu, F. (2012, April). 
Hardware Backdooring is Practical, 
Proceedings of the Hackito Ergo Sum (HES), 
Paris, France. 
[14] Bulygin, Y. (2008, April). CPU Side-channels 
vs. Virtualization Malware: The Good, the 
Bad, or the Ugly. Proceedings of the 
ToorCon. Seattle, WA, USA. 
[15] Bulygin, Y., & Samyde, D. (2008, August). 
Chipset Based Approach to Detect 
Virtualization Malware a.k.a. DeepWatch. 
Proceedings of the Black Hat Security 
Conference, Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
[16] Bulygin, Y., Loucaides, J., Furtak, A., 
Bazhaniuk, O., & Matrosov, A. (2014, 
August). Summary of Attacks against BIOS 
and Secure Boot. Proceedings of the DefCon, 
Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
[17] Coreboot. (2014). Retrieved on October 12, 
2014, from www.coreboot.org 
[18] Dai Zovi, D. (2006). Hardware Virtualization-
Based Rootkits. Proceedings of the Black Hat 
Security Conference, Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
[19] Derock, A. (2009, October 28-30). HVM 
Virtual Machine Monitor, a Powerful 
Concept for Forensic and Anti-Forensic. 
Paper presented at the Hack.lu conference, 
Luxembourg. 
[20] Desnos, A., Filiol, E., & Lefou, I. (2011). 
Detecting (and creating !) a HVM rootkit (aka 
BluePill-like). Journal in Computer Virology, 
7(1), 23–50. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11416-009-0130-8 
[21] Duflot, L., Etiemble, D., & Grumelard, O. 
(2006, April). Using CPU System 
Management Mode to Circumvent Operating 
System Security Functions. Proceedings of 
the CanSecWest Applied Security Conference, 
Paris, France. 
[22] Embleton, S. (2007). The VMM framework. 
Hacker Tools. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from http://www.mobile-
download.net/tools/software/vmxcpu.rar 
[23] Embleton, S., Sparks, S., & Zou, C. (2008, 
September 22-25). SMM Rootkits: A New 
Breed of OS Independent Malware. 
Proceedings of the 4th International 
Conference on Security and Privacy in 
Communication Networks (SecureComm). 
Istanbul, Turkey. 
 [24] Fannon, C. (2014, June). An Analysis of 
Hardware-assisted Virtual Machine based 
Rootkits. (Master’s thesis) Naval Postgraduate 
School. Monterey, CA, USA. Retrieved on 
October 12, 2014, from 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42621 
[25] Fisher-Ogden, J. (2006). Hardware Support 
for Efficient Virtualization. Technical report, 
University of California. San Diego, CA, 
USA. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~jfisherogden/hardwar
eVirt.pdf 
[26] Fog, A. (2014). Lists of Instruction Latencies, 
Throughputs and Micro Operation 
Breakdowns for Intel, AMD and VIA CPUs. 
Agner Fog Homepage. Retrieved on October 
12, 2014, from 
http://www.agner.org/optimize/instruction_ta
bles.pdf 
[27] Fritsch, H. (2008, August). Analysis and 
Detection of Virtualization-based Rootkits. 
Master’s thesis, Technical University of 
Munich, Germany. Retrieved on October 12, 
2014, from 
http://www.nm.ifi.lmu.de/pub/Fopras/frit08/P
DF-Version/frit08.pdf 
[28] Gabris, F. (2009, August 22). Turning off 
Hypervisor and Resuming OS in 100 
Instructions, Paper presented at the Fasm 
Conference (Fasm Con). Myjava, Slovak 
Republic. 
[29] Garfinkel, T., Adams, K., Warfield, A., & 
Franklin, J. (2007). Compatibility is Not 
Transparency: VMM Detection Myths and 
Realities. Paper presented at the 11th 
USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in 
Operating Systems (HotOS). Berkeley, CA, 
USA. 
[30] Graziano, M., Lanzi, A., & Balzarotti, D. 
(2013, October 23-25). Hypervisor Memory 
Forensics, Proceedings of the 16th 
International Symposium Research in Attacks, 
Intrusions, and Defenses (RAID), 21-40, 
Rodney Bay, Saint Lucia. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41284-
4_2 
[31] Intel. (1998). Using the RDTSC Instruction 
for Performance Monitoring. Carleton 
Computer Security Lab (CCSL). Retrieved on 
October 12, 2014, from 
http://www.ccsl.carleton.ca/~jamuir/rdtscpm1
.pdf 
[32] Intel. (2014, September). Intel 64 and IA-32 
Architectures Software Developer’s Manual 
Volume 3C: System Programming Guide, 
Part 3, Order Number: 326019-052US. 
[33] ISO 5725 (2004). Accuracy (Trueness and 
Precision) of Measurement Methods and 
Results, Parts 1-6. 
[34] Jian, N., Huaimin, W., Shize, G., & Bo, L. 
(2010). CBD: A Counter-Based Detection 
Method for VMM in Hardware Virtualization 
Technology. Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing, Signal Processing and 
Applications (PCSPA). Harbin, China. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pcspa.2010.92 
[35] Kovah, X., Kallenberg, C., Butterworth, J., & 
Cornwell, S. (2014, September 24). Into the 
Unknown: How to Detect BIOS-level 
Attackers. Paper presented at the 24th Virus 
Bulletin International Conference (VB2014), 
Seattle, WA, USA. 
[36] Korkin, I., & Nesterov I., (2014, May 28-29). 
Applying Memory Forensics to Rootkit 
Detection. Paper presented at the Proceedings 
of the 9th annual Conference on Digital 
Forensics, Security and Law (CDFSL),  
115-141, Richmond, VA, USA. 
[37] Korkin, I. (2012, July 12). Hypervisor 
Detection in Symantec Endpoint Protection. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://igorkorkin.blogspot.ru/2012/07/hypervi
sor-detection-in-symantec.html 
[38] Korkin I. (2014). Hypervisor Detection 
Platform. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from 
http://sites.google.com/site/iykorkin/hdp.zip 
[39] Kornfeld, M. (1965, March). Accuracy and 
Reliability of a Simple Experiment. (in 
Russian) 85 (3), Number UFN 85 533–542, 
533-542, Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from 
http://ufn.ru/ufn65/ufn65_3/Russian/r653e.pd
f 
[40] Kyte, I., Zavarsky, P., Lindskog, D., & Ruhl, 
R. (2012, June 10-12). Detection of Hardware 
Virtualization Based Rootkits by Performance 
Benchmarking. Concordia University College 
of Alberta. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from 
 http://infosec.concordia.ab.ca/files/2012/04/2
011Kyte.pdf 
[41] Kyte, I., Zavarsky, P., Lindskog, D., & Ruhl, 
R. (2012, January). Enhanced side-channel 
analysis method to detect hardware 
virtualization based rootkits. Proceedings of 
the World Congress on Internet Security 
(WorldCIS), 192-201, Guelph, ON, Canada. 
[42] Lakshminarayanan, K., Patel, K., Robinson, 
D., & Soulami, T. (2012). U.S. Patent No. 
8,205,241 B2. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office. 
[43] Li, H., Zhu, J., Zhou T., & Wang, Q. (2011, 
May 27-29). A new Mechanism for 
Preventing HVM-Aware Malware. 
Proceedings of the 3rd International 
Conference on Communication Software and 
Networks (ICCSN), 163-167, Shaanxi, China, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICCSN.2011.60146
96 
[44] McAfee. (2012). Root out Rootkits: An Inside 
Look at McAfee Deep Defender. Intel. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/publi
c/us/en/documents/white-papers/mcafee-
deep-defender-deepsafe-rootkit-protection-
paper.pdf 
[45] Microsoft. (2013, August 8) Hypervisor Top-
Level Functional Specification: Windows 
Server 2012 R2. Released Version 4.0a. 
[46] Medley, D. (2007, March). Virtualization 
Technology Applied to Rootkit Defense. 
Master’s thesis, AFIT/GCE/ENG/07-08, 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, USA, 
Accession Number ADA469494. 
[47] Morabito, D. (2012, June). Detecting 
Hardware-Assisted Hypervisor Rootkits 
within Nested Virtualized Environments. 
Master’s thesis, AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-20, 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, USA, 
Accession Number ADA563168. 
[48] Muchychka, A. (2013). Lenovo IdeaPad 
B560: How to Flash KBC BIOS. Hardware 
Today. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://hardware-
today.com/articles/notebooks/lenovo_ideapad
_b560_how_to_flash_kbc_bios_reasons_no_p
ower_led_indicators_don_t_work 
[49] Myers, M., & Youndt, S. (2007 Aug). An 
Introduction to Hardware-Assisted Virtual 
Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Mega Security. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://megasecurity.org/papers/hvmrootkits.pd
f 
[50] North Security Labs (2011). Blog. Retrieved 
on October 12, 2014, from 
http://northsecuritylabs.blogspot.ru/2011/11/g
reetings-to-all-we-have-great-news.html 
[51] Nohl, K., & Lell, J. (2014, August 2-7). 
BadUSB - On Accessories That Turn Evil, 
Proceedings of the Black Hat Security 
Conference, Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
[52] O'Neill, D. (2010) How to Detect 
Virtualization. Dave O'Neill Homepage. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://www.dmo.ca/blog/detecting-
virtualization-on-linux/ 
[53] Park, J. (2013, October 30). A Study on 
Detection of Hacking and Malware Codes in 
Bare Metal Hypervisor for Virtualized 
Internal Environment of Cloud Service. 
International Journal of Computer Science 
and Network Security (IJCSNS), 13(10), 78-
82. 
[54] Pek, G, & Buttyan, L. (2014, June 10-14). 
Towards the Automated Detection of 
Unknown Malware on Live Systems. 
Proceedings of the IEEE International 
Conference on Communications (ICC), 847-
852, Sydney, NSW, Australia, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2014.6883425 
[55] Ramos, J. (2009, December). Security 
Challenges with Virtualization. Master’s 
thesis, University of Lisbon, Portugal. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/124
24378.pdf 
[56] Rutkowska, J. (2006). Subverting Vista 
Kernel for Fun and Profit. Proceedings of the 
Symposium on Security for Asia Network 
(SyScan) & Black Hat Briefings, Singapore & 
Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
[57] Rutkowska, J., & Tereshkin, A. (2007). 
IsGameOver(), Anyone? Proceedings of the 
Black Hat Security Conference, Las Vegas, 
NV, USA. 
[58] Rutkowska, J., & Tereshkin, A. (2008, 
August). Bluepilling the Xen Hypervisor. 
Proceedings of the Black Hat Security 
Conference, Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
[59] Strelen, J. (2004, December 5-8). The 
Accuracy of a New Confidence Interval 
 Method. Proceedings of the Winter 
Simulation Conference. Washington, DC, 
USA, 654-662, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WSC.2004.1371373 
[60] TianoCore. (2014). Retrieved on October 12, 
2014, from http://tianocore.github.io/ 
[61] Tichonov, A., & Avetisyan, A. (2011). 
Development of Taint-analysis Methods to 
Solve the Problem of Searching of 
Undeclared Features. Proceedings of the 
Institute for System Programming of Russian 
Academy of Sciences (ISPRAS), 20, 9-24, 
Moscow, Russia. 
[62] The SciPy Community. (2009). Calculate the 
First Order Difference. SciPy developers. 
Retrieved on October 12, 2014, from 
http://docs.scipy.org/doc/numpy/reference/ge
nerated/numpy.diff.html 
[63] The Xen Project. (2014). Retrieved on 
October 12, 2014, from 
http://www.xenproject.org/ 
[64] Utin, M. (2014, November 20-21). A Myth or 
Reality – BIOS-based Hypervisor Threat. 
Proceedings of the In-Depth Security 
Conference (DeepSec), Vienna, Austria. 
[65] Vectorization (mathematics). (2014). In 
Wikipedia. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vectorization_(m
athematics) 
[66] Wailly, A. (2013, June 20). Malware vs 
Virtualization: The Endless Cat and Mouse 
Play. Proceedings of the Hack in Paris (HIP) 
Conference. Paris, France. Retrieved on 
October 12, 2014, from 
http://aurelien.wail.ly/publications/hip-2013-
slides.html 
[67] Wang, Z., & Jiang, X. (2010, May 16-19). 
HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to 
Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow 
Integrity. Proceedings of the 31st IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 
Oakland, CA, USA, 380–395. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.30 
[68] Wojtczuk, R., & Rutkowska, J. (2009, 
February 18-19). Attacking Intel Trusted 
Execution Technology. Proceedings of the 
Black Hat Security Conference, Washington 
DC, USA. 
[69] Wojtczuk, R., Rutkowska, J., & Tereshkin, A. 
(2009, December). Another Way to 
Circumvent Intel Trusted Execution 
Technology. Retrieved on October 12, 2014, 
from 
http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/misc0
9/Another TXT Attack.pdf 
[70] Zmudzinski, K. (2009). U.S. Patent No. 
US20090172229 A1. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
 
